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‘Suicide, drug abuse, posttraumatic stress disorder, panic, depression, divorce,’
began General Casey [.]. ‘What does positive psychology say about all that,
Dr. Seligman?’
Seligman (2018), p. 311.

1. Introduction
This chapter revisits the controversies surrounding the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) initiative, a program developed in 2008 by a
team of psychologists led by Martin E.P. Seligman to prevent mental health
problems among U.S. soldiers after their deployment to Afghanistan and
Iraq. In the following sections, several aspects of these controversies are
placed in their broader historical and theoretical contexts, including the
ethical objections the initiative has raised, key concepts that underlie its
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rationale, as well as Seligman’s efforts to promote it through his popular
writings. Although Seligman describes the program as based on objective
empirical ﬁndings, I argue that it nevertheless carries with it normative
implications. Not only does it perpetuate problematic ideas about what it
means to fall mentally ill, it also relies on implicit assumptions about human
development that are equally questionable. Positive psychologists such as
Seligman, I contend, endorse a vision of psychological growth that imagines
it as unfolding along a linear trajectory that is both continuous and
predictable. Ironically, the plausibility of this vision is challenged by the
very experience of trauma, the effects of which the CSF program is supposed
to inoculate against.
I begin my discussion by providing some historical context for the emergence of the contemporary notion of posttraumatic stress and psychiatric
prevention programs in the U.S. military.

2. The trauma of war and the prevention of
psychiatric casualties
Ever since the American Civil War, military physicians have observed
soldiers returning from the battleﬁelds e often quite literally e shaken and
distraught yet outwardly physically unharmed. It was the massive breakdown of soldiers in the trenches of World War I, however, that prompted
authorities in war-waging nations to devise means not only to treat but also
to prevent what by then were mostly considered disorders of psychological
origin. Unleashing destructive forces on an unprecedented industrial scale,
the Great War led to an epidemic of neuropsychiatric casualties that was
difﬁcult to ignore.
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the most promising strategy
of preventing such breakdowns was the screening and rigorous selection of
recruits. During the previous conﬂict, military psychiatrists had already
experimented with what came to be considered an effective method of
secondary prevention, namely treating psychiatric casualties with little delay,
close to the front lines. The aim of these methods was to prevent the
condition from becoming chronic and to return the soldier to the battleﬁeld.
In 1940, the U.S. government’s Selective Service System implemented a
thorough screening program to reduce the number of those who would
have to be temporarily removed from the battleﬁeld. The program was set
up to identify inductees who supposedly showed signs of maladjustment to
the vicissitudes of civilian life and were therefore presumed to succumb to
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the much harsher conditions in the military. In some instances, up to a
quarter of those examined were deemed unﬁt to serve (Pols, 2007). But e
to the surprise of many psychiatrists e selection alone proved insufﬁcient
to prevent psychiatric casualties during World War II, as in subsequent wars.
As the debates over America’s participation in the war in Vietnam
exposed political and cultural fault lines in the 1960s and 1970s, combatinduced psychiatric disorders became an issue not just of medical but also
of great public concern. The introduction of the diagnosis posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) in 1980 reﬂected a sea change in the public conversation about the psychological hazards of war and of experiences of violence
more broadly. Although, the rate of American soldier breakdowns had been
lower in Vietnam than in the two previous wars (Dean, 1997). In the postVietnam era, psychiatric symptoms, now directly related to combat experiences, often surfaced only after soldiers had returned from a war zone.
According to the causal mechanism that was postulated for PTSD such difﬁculties stemmed from a harmful experience, a trauma, coming back to
haunt the victims in the form of involuntary memories (Young, 1997;
2008).
The broad application of the PTSD diagnosis had implications for how
psychiatric casualties were treated as well as for how the military approached
the prevention of combat-related disorders. Previous strategies included
efforts to improve or stabilise troop morale, to educate soldiers about the
mental challenges they may face during deployment, and, in the immediate
post-World War II era especially, to sensitise the public to the difﬁculties
returning soldiers were likely to experience as they readjusted to civilian
life (Pols & Oak, 2007). The traumatic origin of many mental health problems, however, turned the attention of experts, as well as the public’s
concern, away from the social conditions that shape how individuals and
societies respond to psychological trauma and towards the harmful events
and the stress reactions they provoked.
Framing posttraumatic symptoms as a universal response to extreme stress
accelerated and solidiﬁed what one could call the decontextualization of
traumatic experience. In addition, many clinicians, who fought for the
introduction of the PTSD diagnosis, on moral and political as much as on
scientiﬁc grounds (Scott, 1990), were warry of attempts to complicate the
matter. For too long, the medical establishment had lacked a diagnostic
vocabulary that acknowledged the existence of posttraumatic suffering, as
psychiatrists had mostly attributed the onset and persistence of combatrelated disorders to the victim’s predisposition, his or her personal history

214

Ulrich Koch

prior to the event, or the presumably hazardous incentives of the pension
system (see e.g., Hacking, 1998; Leese, 2002; Leys, 2010; Micale, Lerner,
& Rosenberg, 2001; Micale, 2009; Young, 1997). The focus on the event
and its stress-inducing effects, in other words, quite effectively undermined
a morally questionable line of clinical reasoning that, in hindsight, amounted
to victim-blaming.
By 2008, when the U.S. Armed Forces solicited the help of the University of Pennsylvania psychologist Martin Seligman to develop a prevention
program to enhance soldiers’ psychological ﬁtness, the pendulum had begun
to swing back, and the question was addressed yet again why some individuals are more likely to succumb to trauma. Recent epidemiological studies
suggested that not all who experience trauma develop symptoms of PTSD
(cf. Jones & Wessely, 2007); and, in the 1990s, psychologists began researching risk and protective factors to help explain why. Together with his
collaborators, Seligman adapted and tested a series of interventions drawn
from the Penn Resiliency Program, which was developed to prevent
depression in educational settings (Gillham, Jaycox, Reivich, Seligman, &
Silver, 1990), to build resilience to trauma and other adverse situations
among military personnel. Previously, the Army had tested the efﬁcacy of
other interventions designed to prevent PTSD, such as the Battlemind
Training, that were applied post-deployment to ease the re-adjustment to
the civilian environment (Adler, Bliese, McGurk, Hoge, & Castro, 2011).
The initiative, christened Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF), soon
drew criticism from other psychologists who raised a number of ethical
concerns.
Before engaging in this debate, however, I need to situate two concepts
central to this initiative, resilience and posttraumatic growth, within the wider
project of positive psychology e a scientiﬁc movement launched by Seligman and other social scientists, mostly psychologist, in the late 1990s.

3. Positive psychology, resilience and posttraumatic
growth
At its heart, at least according to its most inﬂuential and outspoken
ambassadors, positive psychology is about rejecting what was wrong with
academic psychology at the end of the 20th century: the supposedly negative
outlook that stemmed from the discipline’s focus on disease and dysfunction,
curtailing psychology’s potential. Rather than simply “repairing damage”
and “operating within a disease model of human functioning,” Seligman
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and the creativity researcher Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi argued in a programmatic paper that psychological knowledge should be employed to improve
also the functioning and wellbeing of “normal people” (Seligman &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, pp. 5e8). Why simply contend with alleviating
suffering, with bringing people back to normal, if you could strive for their
improvement?
With ample ﬁnancial support from a number of private funding bodies,
positive psychologists set out to study positive human emotions, positive
personality traits, and e in practice, to a noticeably lesser extent e positive
institutions, hoping that their interventions would lead to positive developments for individuals and society as a whole (Seligman, 2018). Further attesting to the movement’s success, educational programs in applied positive
psychology began springing up at a number of universities around the globe,
following a model pioneered at the University of Pennsylvania.
This self-styled movement of academic renewal was in many ways not as
ground-breaking as its proponents claimed. Critics could point to humanistic traditions in psychology and their long-standing concern with what
positive psychologists began describing as personal growth and ﬂourishing.
The impetus to research the conditions underlying mental wellbeing was
also not entirely new. Already in 1948, the constitution of the World Health
Organisation had deﬁned health not merely as the absence of ill health, but
as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being” (WHO,
1948). Positive psychology’s concern with aggregate measures of happiness,
treated as indices of social progress in post-industrial societies, was predated
by the study of quality of life, promoted by the economist John Kenneth
Galbraith in the 1960s (Galbraith, 1964). And in the late 1970s, after
analysing health data of Holocaust survivors (Antonovsky, Maoz, Dowty,
& Wijsenbeek, 1971), the Israeli-American medical sociologist Aaron
Antonovsky (1979a) urged health researchers to study what he called salutogenesis (as opposed to pathogenesis), the social conditions and personality
traits associated with faster recovery and a lower likelihood of falling ill in
the ﬁrst place; the factors that make and keep people healthy, in other words.
Similarly, both the concept of resilience as well as the notion of posttraumatic growth have their predecessors. While there exist no uniform deﬁnitions
for both constructs (Maercker & Zoellner, 2004; Meredith et al., 2011), psychological resilience is often described as “the ability of an individual to
‘bounce back’ after experiencing stress,” to restore a homeostatic state of
physical and psychological equilibrium (Meadows, Miller, & Robson,
2015, p. 9). Posttraumatic growth, which is believed to sometimes occur
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in highly resilient individuals in the wake of extreme adversity, is “not simply a return to a baseline,” as Richard Tedeschi and Richard Calhoun (both
leading authorities on the matter) write, “e it is an experience of improvement [in the wake of trauma] that for some persons is deeply profound”
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004, p. 4).
Considerable conceptual overlap exists between resilience and earlier
concepts such as hardiness, a personality trait, ﬁrst observed among managers,
that is thought to protect from the onslaught of daily stressors (Kobasa,
1979), or the supportive web of personal beliefs Antonovsky summed up
as sense of coherence (Antonovsky, 1979b). The historical precursors of posttraumatic growth, on the other hand, more often trace back to discourses
situated outside the conﬁnes of academic psychology. Throughout the last
century, alpinists, psychotherapists e such as Victor Frankl, himself a Holocaust survivor e as well as physicians who shared their interest in near-death
experiences have attempted to draw out the transformative potential of harrowing accidents, of coming to terms with a terminal diagnosis and other
catastrophic experiences that today are readily classiﬁed as traumatic
(Martinovic, 2017). Moreover, the medical doctrine that an upsetting,
frightful event may also have curative effects has a relatively long and visible
tradition that reaches through the 19th and back into the late 18th
centuries e a history which includes the infamous shock therapeutics of
asylum medicine (Koch, 2014).
Positive psychology, demarcated from now obscure medical traditions,
humanistic psychology and various other intellectual enterprises, successfully
asserted itself as a discipline ﬁrmly grounded in contemporary psychological
research. Unlike the recommendations found in the popular self-help
literature, with which positive psychology shares numerous themes,
Seligman (1999) contends that the interventions of positive psychology
are evidence-based and informed by current scientiﬁc models. More
recently, however, the validity of several empirical claims put forth by
positive psychologists have been called into question; and their theoretical
efforts have received at times damning critiques (e.g., Brown, Sokal, &
Friedman, 2013; Lazarus, 2003; Brown, Lomas, & Eiroa-Orosa, 2017; see
also Seligman, 2018, Chapter 22). Also, given the current replication crisis
in the social sciences that has sowed doubts about the reliability of
experimental ﬁndings in psychological research, some members of the
movement have urged their colleagues to become more self-critical and
circumspect with regards to their empirical claims (see Robbins & Friedman,
2018).
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Seligman’s collaboration with the US Army dates from a time before
many of these critiques surfaced. It is the CSF initiative and the ethical concerns it has raised to which I will now turn. In this context, the question of
the program’s scientiﬁc validity is surely relevant, but a methodological
critique of positive psychology is not what is undertaken here (for a critical
review of the available evidence on the program’s effectiveness see
Steenkamp, Nash, & Litz, 2013). As we will see, in the case of traumatic
suffering it proves difﬁcult to disentangle moral concerns from scientiﬁc
questions about human responses to extreme adversity. As such they pose
problems that cannot be resolved by an improvement of the program’s
methods.
First, it is important to note that CSF was designed to promote wellbeing
and prevent all types of mental health problems members of the military (and
their families) might face, not just PTSD. The idea of posttraumatic growth,
however, plays a central role in the program’s rationale.

4. Growth and comprehensive ﬁtness
In his autobiography, Seligman begins the origin story of his collaboration with the U.S. Armed Forces by recounting his response to a question
about what positive psychology had to offer in support of the army’s ﬁght
against mental illness (which served me as the epigraph for this chapter):
“The human reaction to awful events like combat”, he began his reply,
“is bell-shaped.” Individuals who fall into the lower end of the distribution
succumb to trauma, with the known effects of PTSD, depression, drug
abuse and suicide e “different names for the ways in which people’s lives
are ruined.” The majority of individuals, however, are resilient, they may
struggle initially but after a few months “they are back where they were
before.” At the higher, right end of the distribution are those who grow
from their experiences, who “one year later are stronger e by our physical
and psychological measures e than they were to begin with.” Therefore,
Seligman concluded his pitch, the army should strive to move “the
whole curve right-ward, toward posttraumatic growth” (Seligman, 2018,
pp. 311e312).
Seligman’s answer, his choice of metaphors is telling. The analogy between physical strength and resilience, which can be trained like a muscle,
is a powerful one. The prevention program developed by Seligman’s
team, together with Brigadier General Rhonda Cornum, a physician with
a specialisation in urology, was conceived as a training program to enhance
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mental ﬁtness. It consisted of three components. After an initial assessment
phase to establish a baseline, participating soldiers completed online modules
to improve their ﬁtness in four domains (emotions, relationships, family, and
spirituality). Unlike the additional psychoeducational unit on posttraumatic
growth, these modules were not mandatory. More relevant and arguably
more effective in fostering resilience was the week-long face-to-face Master
Resilience Training drill sergeants received, who were then instructed to
pass on what they had learned to their subordinates.
Why was the module on posttraumatic growth deemed important? In an
interview with the Harvard Business Review, Seligman (2011c) mentions that,
in his experience, a vast majority of soldiers were aware of the possible negative effects of trauma, but only a small minority had heard of posttraumatic
growth. Soldiers’ focus on the negative, on PTSD, and being unaware of the
fact that only a minority respond to trauma with a chronic condition, he
reckoned, may become an impediment to recovery. Beliefs about PTSD
turn out to be self-fulﬁlling, he argued, a downward spiral wherein negative
expectations and negative reactions mutually reinforce each other
(Seligman, 2011c).
Building on Tedeschi’s work, the educational module on posttraumatic
growth attempted to ﬁll this knowledge gap. Soldiers learn that initial strong
emotional reactions to devastating experiences, along with shattered beliefs
about oneself, others and the world, are indeed normal. They also learn
techniques and attitudes that may lead to posttraumatic growth in the
wake of trauma: techniques for controlling involuntary remembering,
disclosing oneself to others, “creating a narrative in which trauma is seen
as a fork in the road” that comes with new possibilities, and articulating a
set of “life principles” (Seligman, 2011a, p. 4).

5. Preventing posttraumatic stress versus preventing
trauma
Critics have argued that Seligman and his team naively subscribed to
the operational imperatives of the U.S. Army, never questioning that the institution’s needs might diverge from the needs of the soldiers undergoing the
interventions. The clinical psychologist Roy Eidelson and his co-authors, for
instance, have pointed out that the articles featured in a special issue of the
American Psychologist devoted to the program fail to discuss any of its potential
adverse effects (see, e.g., Cornum, Matthews, & Seligman, 2011). This is
especially troubling, they contend, since prior to implementing the
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initiative, no pilot study was conducted, no informed consent obtained from
the participants, nor was there an assessment of the program’s ethical ramiﬁcations by an institutional review board (Eidelson, Pilisuk, & Soldz, 2011).
(The army’s, as well as Seligman’s [2018], defence against the latter charge
has been that the intervention, which reached more than one million
soldiers, did not constitute a research project in the proper sense and that,
therefore, other ethical standards should apply.) Might those soldiers who
view combat “as a growth opportunity”, Eidelson and his colleagues ask,
pose a potential harm to their comrades, to civilians, or even to themselves,
as they more readily engage in reckless behaviour? Will they be more
inclined to participate in atrocities and other transgressions that they will
later come to regret, leaving them “morally injured” (Eidelson et al.,
2011, p. 4)?1 Another issue they raise e one that perhaps more clearly illustrates the moral unease felt by these critics e points directly to the limits of
positive psychology’s individualist outlook: They charge that the special
issue contributors, who were all involved in the program’s execution,
systematically disregard signs of other, systemic sources of traumatic stress
unrelated to combat but instead to the structural conditions of the military,
such as the experience of sexual assault among servicewomen. This “calls less
for building a [.] resilient outlook”, they note, “than for recognition of
how the commonplace victimisation of women in war should be vociferously prevented” (Eidelson et al., 2011, p. 4).
For Seligman and his collaborators, preventing PTSD or other traumarelated disorders is not the same as e and does not amount to e preventing
trauma. And they’ve devoted themselves to the former. It is positive psychology’s commitment to preventing posttraumatic symptoms (and
enabling posttraumatic growth) while showing little interest in what causes
them, I believe, that provokes moral concern.
To psychological researchers, differentiating between an event and the
person experiencing it is sound scientiﬁc practice. In the case of trauma,
however, this seemingly straightforward task proves stubbornly difﬁcult

1

With this remark, the authors reference more recent clinical theorising that stresses the moral
dimension of psychologically harmful war experiences. Soldiers may be left morally injured, clinical
researchers such as Brett Litz and Shira Maguen argue, after engaging in “unnecessary acts of violence”
or failing to prevent them (Litz et al., 2009). The idea of moral injury, ﬁrst popularised by the
psychiatrist Jonathan Shay (1995), coincides with a shift in focus away from the fear-inducing aspects
of trauma to the moral, more existential questions that often arise from combat experiences.
Accordingly, those who call for its study see moral injury as distinct from PTSD, which, in their view,
has become too inclusive as a diagnostic category (see also MacLeish, 2018).
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(as the enduring debates about the DSM’s so-called “stressor criterion”
show; see, e.g., McNally, 2003; Roberts et al., 2012). Trauma is a relational
concept that cannot be delimited without taking into account how the
event affects the traumatised. The distinction between objective event and
subjective experience is, moreover, difﬁcult to uphold since we are not
morally indifferent to traumatic events. Trauma leads to human suffering, often
involves actors who possess agency and is, therefore, usually avoidable
(Hampe, 2007).
What’s more, during most of the 20th century, the recognition that posttraumatic symptoms of various kinds were indeed caused by trauma, and not
by a pre-existing condition or congenital weakness, hinged upon the
conviction that those who experienced such events were so-called normal
individuals and that it was instead the horriﬁc, abnormal events that victims
had to endure that caused posttraumatic ailments (Koch, 2014). In other
words: normative, historically variable assumptions about what constitutes
an abnormal experience inadvertently shape what is identiﬁed as a traumatic
stressor. Combat once belonged to the class of unpleasant experiences a
normal (male) individual was expected to endure. This is no longer the
case. In 1987, the revised third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, the DSM-III-R, deﬁned a “traumatic stressor”
as an “event outside the range of normal human experience” (APA, 1987,
p. 247).
Because PTSD may constitute a normal reaction to an abnormal
experience, acknowledging trauma as such often includes a call to action
to prevent it. (The very act of remembering trauma, in all its individual
and collective, public and private forms, has recently become a moral as
much as a therapeutic act.) Diverting attention away from the events to their
psychological effects threatens to obfuscate the moral urgency that trauma
has come to represent. Implementing a strategy to prevent symptoms without
signalling a commitment to also prevent what causes them becomes ethically
questionable, especially if the causes are morally objectionable human
actions.
A hypothetical example can illustrate this point. Only recently have
discriminatory police practices that single out African-American men
entered public awareness in the USA. Suffering violence at the hands of
the police will undoubtedly lead to symptoms of posttraumatic stress. However, the idea to prevent such symptoms by offering resilience training for
members of a corresponding subpopulation, say, African-American males
between the ages of 6 and 10, would, rightly so, raise a moral outcry.
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The implementation of such measures e even if they had been found to be
efﬁcacious e would indicate a kind of moral defeat. It would signal to future
victims of police brutality that any attempts to tackle systemic racism are
either futile or not a worthy moral cause. The responsibility for dealing
with the fallout of a societal problem, moreover, would be burdened
onto those who already bear the brunt of it.
For a society at war, however, the detached verdict that trauma is
inevitable may be easier to accept. Given the politically charged climate
at the time CSF was implemented, it comes as no surprise to Seligman
(2018) that most of his critics also opposed the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Their critiques, so he alleged, were politically motivated. But again,
the case of trauma illustrates that the boundary between science and morality is often difﬁcult to draw and even more so to uphold. There is no
neutral ground here. Treating the trauma of war as inevitable reﬂects a
moral attitude (whether and how one can mount an ethical defence of
war is another matter, of course). In this case, positive psychology’s focus
on the positive in situations where others see little to be positive about,
does not keep it from afﬁrming that there are impactful negative
experiences.
Trauma may present a limit case for positive psychology because of the
inescapability of moral questions in relation to human suffering caused by
violent experiences. Yet it also raises a broader question, namely whether
the discipline can live up to its claim that a focus on the positive side of
human existence and human growth can avoid engaging with its troubling,
dark sides. My answer to this question hinges on how positive psychologists
understand personal growth and how it in turn relates to mental suffering
(see also Lazarus, 2003).

6. Growth as self-optimisation
Critics of positive psychology, especially those steeped in psychology’s
humanistic tradition, have scolded its proponents for a lack of theoretical
clarity and historical depth when it comes to explicating notions like “ﬂourishing” and “growth”, so central to its mission (cf. MacDonald, 2018).
Before pointing out the conceptual ﬂaws, it is instructive to ﬁrst ask how
positive psychologists determine growth. Seligman’s pitch to General Casey
contains a simple, yet by no means trivial answer to this question: Growth is
measured.

222

Ulrich Koch

As mentioned, Seligman likes to invoke the metaphor of strength. In one
of his articles published in the popular press, he cites Friedrich Nietzsche:
“That which does not kill us makes us stronger” (Seligman, 2011a,
p. 101). But he also likes to reference the more prosaic topic of psychometrics (Seligman, 2018, p. 312). Posttraumatic growth becomes tangible as a
measurable improvement. The implication being that growth is the linear
expansion of a set of personal attributes. Moreover, by invoking the image
of a normal distribution, Seligman suggests that there is a continuity between
dysfunctional, normal, and optimal long-term reactions to adversity. Just like
bodily strength, resilience is malleable and can be augmented, which, in
Seligman’s telling, lays the foundation for potential posttraumatic growth:
Ordinary resilience and extraordinary posttraumatic growth can be placed
on different points of the same, continuous dimension.
Leaving aside questions concerning the validity of the bell-shaped,
normal distribution of human responses to adversity, the very concept of
posttraumatic growth raises the question whether the idea of such a continuity is at all plausible. Surely, one can anticipate the possibility of having a
profound personal crisis in the wake of a traumatic experience, but how can
a soldier, or anyone else, prepare for having his or her fundamental beliefs
shattered? Indeed, if posttraumatic growth does entail a “deeply profound”
transformation, a “paradigm shift”, as Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004)
suggest, it would imply that for the one who has yet to undergo this transformation its end-state must remain opaque. It is hard to see what help a
narrative blueprint laying out the possibility of growth would provide to
those who later struggle to ﬁnd that new “fork in the road”, as Seligman
likes to describe it.
Also, from an empirical vantage point, things become more ambiguous,
not less. For instance, researchers in the ﬁeld have discussed the different
outcomes resilience can have and have asked whether it may consist not
in returning to a previous norm but in establishing new ones, a “new
normal” (Bonanno, 2005). In the American Psychologist special issue devoted
to CSF, Tedeschi and the Harvard psychologist Richard McNally (2011)
mention that resilience should not be confounded with posttraumatic
growth (Tedeschi & McNally, 2011). In fact, empirical ﬁndings suggest
that less resilient individuals are more likely to experience posttraumatic
growth (Levine, Laufer, Stein, Hamama-Raz, & Solomon, 2009). Tedeschi
and McNally believe this to be the case because more resilient individuals
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struggle less and, therefore, also have fewer opportunities to grow.2
Moreover, given the inconsistent track record of previous PTSD prevention
programs, they caution against implementing the posttraumatic growth
module before testing its efﬁcacy in a randomised controlled trial (Tedeschi
& McNally, 2011).
Seligman does not waste much ink writing about the possibility that
there are events one cannot prepare for. Particularly in his books and articles
addressing a general readership, he consistently focuses on the kind of adversities one should be able to inoculate oneself against. One of the take-away
messages from his ﬁrst trade book Helplessness: on depression, development, and
death (Seligman, 1975) was that because helplessness is learned it could also be
unlearned, or at least prevented by creating environments that fostered a
belief in control. Urged by his publisher to tend to the, as it were, ﬂipside
of what he had described in his ﬁrst book (Seligman, 2018), he then went
on to write the immensely successful Learned Optimism (2006), which clearly
reﬂects a shift in focus yet is an extension of the same line of reasoning that
highlights the role of beliefs and an optimistic mindset in overcoming
adversity. Prior to positive psychology’s annexation of the topic, personal
transformations in the wake of near-death experiences were thought of in
almost transcendental terms. Seligman, in his popular accounts at least, narrows it down to a linear increase in psychological fortitude.
However, his suggestion to move “the curve rightward towards posttraumatic growth” conﬂicts with one of the fundamental principles with
which he advocated for positive psychology (Seligman, 2018, p. 312).
Because the absence of mental illness is not the same as wellbeing and human
ﬂourishing, he had deemed a research program necessary that was devoted to
studying such positive qualities and developing techniques to augment
them. “Good and bad, positive and negative” are not the kind of opposites
that “lie on the same dimension”, Seligman explains. Rather, “each side
forms its own distinct world with properties not deducible from the absence
of the properties of the other world” (Seligman, 2018, p. 269). Therefore,
he argues, the positive side of human existence forms a distinct area of study.
However, to propose that resilience protects against mental disorders while
its lack leads to mental dysfunction amounts to just that: placing the positive

2

Of course, this leaves out other possible interpretations of this ﬁnding that would challenge the
preventive strategy also endorsed by these authors. For instance, it is plausible that certain active,
problem-focused coping strategies, which indicate high resilience, are simply less effective in the
aftermath of trauma.
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(resilience) and the negative (mental dysfunction) on opposite ends of a
dimension. Only if a decrease in mental dysfunction can be deduced from
an augmentation of resilience does it make sense to declare the latter an
effective method to prevent the former. Either resilience constitutes “its
own distinct world” and does not necessarily inoculate against mental illness,
although the program might nevertheless lead to more posttraumatic
growth, or an increase in resilience protects from falling mentally ill.
Seligman, at times, seems to endorse the ﬁrst option. In his popular writings the focus is on posttraumatic growth. “The army is not a hospital”, he
stated back in 2008 during his initial pitch to General Casey, and although
the military should continue to spend money to treat those whose “lives are
ruined”, such efforts should be supplemented by measures to increase resilience (2018, pp. 312e313). In an article penned for the Harvard Business
Review, he explores how the program could be applied to civilian life, particularly the business world. “The mandatory module, on posttraumatic
growth, is” touted as “highly relevant for business executives”. Throughout
the article he threads the case vignette of the Penn MBA graduate “Douglas”, who quickly bounces back after having lost his job, and within a year
has “grown because of the experience”. During times of “failure and stagnation”, Seligman suggests, resilience training can help to “create an army
of Douglases who can turn their most difﬁcult experiences into catalysts
for improved performance” (Seligman, 2011a, p. 102).
When advocating for resilience and posttraumatic growth, then, the prevention of mental illness is not one of his main talking points. When it comes
to promoting the effectiveness of the CSF interventions, however, he could
point out its proven effectiveness in preventing psychiatric problems,
including an observed decrease in substance use disorders and a lower incidence rate of PTSD, depression, and panic disorder, among soldiers who
were in some way reached by the Master Resilience Training (Seligman,
2018, p. 323). However, one should note that conclusive randomised
control studies about resilience programs in the military are scarce and the
effectiveness of resilience training is still being debated (Meadows et al.,
2015).
The program’s efﬁcacy, or, rather, the lack of sufﬁcient proof thereof, is
one matter that may raise doubts about the utility of resilience training
(Bonanno, Westphal, & Mancini, 2011). Another matter concerns the
ways in which the language of resilience and posttraumatic growth may
shape laypersons’ beliefs about mental illness. Clearly, the expert knowledge
conveyed in the module has normative implications. Participants and those
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who read about the program in the popular press learn, albeit in very broad
terms, how someone should respond to trauma. Seligman himself pointed
out that seemingly neutral descriptions can become self-fulﬁlling or, to
put it differently, prescriptive (see also Hacking, 1995). This holds true
also for the descriptions given by positive psychologists about the beneﬁcial
long-term reactions to adversity. Posttraumatic stress is anticipated as a personal struggle, and posttraumatic growth as a personal task e trauma becomes
an opportunity to grow. Given the nature of the program, participants also
learn that a lack of resilience or ineffective coping leads to mental illness.
The anthropologist Allan Young notes that, in the 1970s, the interest in
human resilience evolved from the study of individuals who withstood
adversity and that resilience “was initially represented as being an unusual
and even extraordinary quality” (Young, 2008, p. 39). Today, Seligman is
not alone in thinking that resilience is rather common. Indeed, some degree
of resilience is believed to be the norm. Seligman empirically grounds this
assumption in experimental data accumulated while studying learned helplessness in laboratory animals (and sometimes in humans) during the 1960s
and 1970s (cf. Seligman, 1975, 2011a). Although, it must be noted that,
at the time, these experiments were not designed to elucidate resilience or
related constructs. Metaphorically speaking, resilience, previously a scarce
resource, is now considered a widely available one that we are encouraged
to grow and capitalise on.
The simple traumatogenic model of mental illness Seligman likes to
invoke proposes that mental health problems such as depression and anxiety
are the outcome of an interaction between an adverse event and a person’s
resilience (cf. Seligman, 2011a, 2011c, 2018). Not only are traumatic events
completely decontextualized in this rendering, but also questions about the
external conditions that sustain posttraumatic symptoms e or that might
positively inﬂuence recovery e are left out. The question, in other words,
of why some fall into the lower end of the distribution is only inadequately
addressed, if at all. A lack of resilience, presented as a quasi-natural resource
but in actuality a set of social and psychological skills, is the only viable
candidate for an explanation. What happens to someone after an adverse
event, for instance, seems to matter very little.
While most can now consider themselves resilient, our reactions to
adversity have at the same time become optimizable, which requires training
and self-monitoring. This leaves one with the question whether such preventive measures that encourage us to grow from traumatic experiences
or warn us of the dangers of showing lasting signs of its impact resurrect
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the stigmatising attitudes of the past. Little more than four decades ago, having a “mental breakdown” in response to trauma was widely considered a
moral failure or a sign of inferiority. The current program’s posttraumatic
growth training module teaches the participants that breaking down in
the face of adversity is “normal”. Yet, this initial struggle can be overcome,
according to Seligman’s upbeat message, by drawing on one’s resilience. The
emphasis on posttraumatic growth runs the risk of replacing the old stigma,
as a marker of deﬁciency and spoiled identity, with a less severe, free-ﬂoating
stigma that attaches itself only to those who withdraw from the struggle to
personally grow from the experience. To escape the blemish of this kind of
stigma, one would have to overcome the temporary state of victimhood one
has been thrust into.3

7. Conclusion: growth as progress
PTSD and other trauma-related disorders represent an anomaly
within current classiﬁcation systems insofar as their aetiology, by deﬁnition,
is known. This poses, I have argued, an ethical challenge for interventions
designed to prevent PTSD. Because traumatic events are today believed
to be at the root of posttraumatic suffering, the decision to prevent symptoms of the latter, instead of the conditions that lead to the former, becomes
morally charged and, at times, ethically questionable. Yet, as I have also
attempted to show, the ethical concerns CSF raises extend beyond questions
about the program’s applicability in a given context. Rather, the interventions themselves reﬂect a narrow, reductive perspective on personal growth
and human development. Interventions such as undergoing the educational
module on post-traumatic growth are reﬂexively shaped both by positive
psychology’s stated mission and the methodological premises underlying
the quantitative study of human behaviour and experience. Particularly in
Seligman’s popular treatments of the topic, it becomes apparent that CSF
training does not only aim at increasing knowledge about mental processes
or providing trainees with skills to help them overcome adversity. The
3

It could be argued that CSF does not adequately address the stigma of mental illness, which carries
numerous costs not just for individuals who suffer from mental disorders but also for healthcare
systems and national economies by signiﬁcantly increasing their disease burden. Considering the
attitudinal and institutional barriers soldiers face when seeking treatment for mental health problems
(Vogt, 2011), extolling the virtues of posttraumatic growth could add to those barriers rather than
diminish them.
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dissemination of knowledge also serves a motivational end; the training
ultimately aims at changing participants’ outlook on adversity, including
their beliefs about their innate ability to overcome hardships. But this inadvertently blurs the line between educational training and guided self-help
intervention. Seligman effectively appeals to the participants’ faith in science
to persuade them to place their faith in themselves.
Underlying positive psychology’s mission, after all, is the idea that perfecting the human condition can be achieved by scientiﬁc means. Rather
than following the advice of self-help gurus or engaging in the unexamined
practices handed down to us by tradition, academic psychology is seen as the
proprietor of targeted, more effective, more rational techniques. It is questionable, however, whether scientiﬁc knowledge holds the key to many
of the pursuits positive psychologists have made their own. Questions about
the good life once fell under the purview of philosophy, and the majority of
humans continue to turn to religion, not only for answers but also to partake
in practices and share in belief systems that imbue their lives with meaning.
In our present age, scientiﬁc insights, of course, cannot and should not be
excluded when tackling questions about human fulﬁlment. But although
scientiﬁc ﬁndings may prompt a reﬂection on values, the sciences themselves
do not possess the means to evaluate ends. Scientiﬁc knowledge seeks to
explain and predict; it does not provide us with the kind of knowledge
that helps adjudicate purposes and deliberate questions of meaning (see
Smith, 2005). It is not clear how the telos of human striving can be inferred
from scientiﬁc insights.
The purported ingredients of a good life identiﬁed by positive psychologists, for instance, are unsurprising and often stand on questionable theoretical grounds. Seligman’s proposal that well-being or ﬂourishing is comprised
of (at least)4 ﬁve interrelated elements: positive emotions, engagement,
relationships, meaning, and accomplishment (PERMA), is not entirely
implausible, but it also appears somewhat arbitrary and, surely, debatable
(see Seligman, 2011b).5 An “element” is deﬁned as “what free, nonsuffering
people choose to pursue for its own sake” (Seligman, 2018, p. 260). Unlike
4
5

This is not yet a deﬁnitive list and may be revised soon (Seligman, 2018).
Seligman (2018) provides the readers of his autobiography a glimpse into the process that led to the
list: “I had posited three elements of wellbeing. [.] But in teaching MAPP [Master’s in Applied
Positive Psychology] and thinking about what questionnaires to put on the [Authentic Happiness]
website, I now became convinced that there were ﬁve elements. [.] I revised the theory after
considering how commonly people pursue achievement doggedly for its own sake: even if it brings no
happiness, no ﬂow, no relationships, no meaning” (pp. 260e1).
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the ones of the periodic table, however, there exists no systematic relationship between these elements, nor do they all refer to the same type of entity.
We don’t pursue meaning in the same sense that we pursue positive emotions or ﬂow (engagement). Most entries on Seligman’s list e relationships,
meaning, and accomplishment e have less to do with what motivates people
and more so with what many of them value. (When we fall in love or
commit to a friendship, we do it because of another person and not because
we pursue relationships for their own sake.) And, of course, everyone can
think of elements they would like to see on this list because they value
them highly. Does knowledge fall under accomplishment or is it irrelevant
as a source of well-being? What about self-determination?
Seligman emphasises that his theory of well-being is empirically
grounded and therefore merely descriptive. He does not wish to tell people
how they should live their lives. Whether and how much someone draws on
these sources to ﬂourish is said to vary (Seligman, 2011b). Clearly, members
of individualist societies value their independence and choices in pursuing
the good life. The success of positive psychology would be more difﬁcult
to comprehend would it present to its users a list of routines that are part
of a greater whole, a web of beliefs and practices that explicitly endorse a
certain way of life or present a distinct worldview. Instead, positive psychologists prescribe isolated exercises, such as the daily routine of counting three
blessings, that are eerily similar to some religious practices or those described
in self-help books but do not form part of a cosmology. Such activities
nevertheless reﬂect and, ultimately, promote a particular way of viewing
the world. The values that positive psychology draws on are not random
and disconnected but are linked to social norms, which are historically
contingent. The elements that make up PERMA, for instance, are easily
recognised as inherent to the different life domains (work, play, family
life, spirituality) through the prism of which many individuals in post-industrialist societies view their recurring activities. The larger point being that
norms can’t be sidestepped when conceiving the life that is worth living.
A set of postulated intrinsic motivations, empirically validated by self-report
measures, is no substitute for contemplating what constitutes the good life.
Just as positive psychology cannot avoid giving certain values preference
over others, it cannot escape the pull of anthropological assumptions. By
promoting the gospel of continuous self-improvement through a particular
kind of science that relies on the quantiﬁcation of what it sets out to
improve, positive psychologists unwittingly provide personal growth with
a trajectory while leaving its endpoint unexamined. Seligman’s narrow
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conceptualisation of posttraumatic growth illustrates this. For the fortunate
few, trauma turns out to be an opportunity to expand along the lines drawn
out for them by experts. The proverbial “new fork in the road” is really a
short cut, or better: an acceleration on the straight and narrow path of incremental self-improvement.
In his autobiography, Seligman mocks unnamed “professors of cultural
anthropology” who question the “undeniable reality of human progress”.
“[Y]ou have to be blinded by ideology”, he writes, “not to see that almost
everything we care about (except mental health) is better now: less
pollution, more democracy, more human rights, less violence, longer life
expectancy, lower child mortality, more music, more education, tastier
food, healthier bodies and more poetry” (Seligman, 2018, p. 277).
The argument is empirically dubious and historically naïve.6 For one, it
conveniently fails to mention the cataclysms that have led to doubts about
the inevitability of progress. Two World Wars, the Holocaust, the threat of
nuclear annihilation and environmental collapse have put proponents of
the idea that humans will steadily increase their control over their environment and curtail their own destructive tendencies on the defencive. Even
during times of relative social stability, it has become clear that
technological progress comes with risks, unintended consequences that
can be harmful. In fact, without the efforts of environmental activists during the 1970s and 1980s, many of whom had their doubts about progress
(Torgerson, 1999), pollution would not have decreased in subsequent decades. In short: at the beginning of the 21st century, it has become difﬁcult
to convincingly argue for the old, all-encompassing notion of inevitable
progress, a philosophy of history that purports to know that where the world
is headed is surely a better place. This does not mean, however, that one
would be hard-pressed to ﬁnd a cultural anthropologist who believes
that progress occurs with regard to speciﬁc aspects of societal life; that
we can, indeed, make progress when it comes to solving speciﬁc social
problems, such as poverty or illiteracy. It is the idea of the inevitability
of progress and that it equally applies to all facets of human life e an
assumption that is as comforting as it is unveriﬁable e that has come under
scrutiny in the 20th century, not the fact that progress does sometimes
happen.

6

A similar argument was recently expounded by the psychologist Steven Pinker (2018) in his
controversial book Enlightenment Now.
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Personal growth mustn’t be understood as progress. More poems do not
inevitably amount to better poetry. The philosopher Ian Hacking once
remarked that “[u]nlike the natural sciences [philosophy] is not in the
progress business”, hence its “perennial themes” (Hacking, 1990, p. 347).
I assume, many poets would say the same about poetry. It represents a rather
narrow vision of personal growth when it is conceived as a linear progression
towards an abstract goal like higher PERMA-scores that in itself remains
vacuous. However, there are still numerous other practices and belief systems on offer that supply methods for sense-making that do not follow
the linear trajectory of continuous improvement. One can strive to live a
good life without compulsively trying to get better at life. In the vision forwarded by positive psychology, which expands a mythical notion of progress
to personal development, less attention is given to the types of transformations that may lead beyond what can be anticipated. But more of the same,
even if it is better, is no substitute for hope.
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